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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

:

RICHARD IVAN LLOYD,

:

Case No.

14472

Defendant-Appellant

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from a conviction of Unlawful Taking of
a Vehicle, a violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-1-109 (1953), one of the
provisions of Utah's Motor Vehicle Act.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was charged with the crime of theft of an operable
motor vehicle, a second degree felony, in an information filed in the
District Court of the Third Judicial District In and For Salt Lake
County, State of Utah on December 5, 1975.

On that date, appellant

entered a plea of not guilty (R.6).
On January 23, 1976, appellant waived the jury and tried the matter
before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall.

Judge Hall acquitted the appellant

of the charge of auto theft contained in the information (R. 91, at
lines 24-26).

The Judge then heard arguments of counsel on the question

as to whether or not the State could refile a misdemeanor charge of
Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle (or Depriving an Owner as it is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
commonly referred
to)
(R.
91-95). The Court then indicated that it
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

found the appellant guilty of that charge which the Court found to be
a lesser and included offense of Theft as charged in the information
(R. 95-96) .
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's verdict of
guilty of the charge of Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle on the
grounds that: (a) the court had acquitted appellant of the felony and
then later decided to convict him of the misdemeanor; and (b) that the
crime of Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle is not a lesser and included
offense of Theft-

Therefore, the Court's verdict of not guilty of

the charge in the information requires this Court to discharge him
from the custody of the Third District Court.
\.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Arthur A. Polad testified that his automobile had been parked
in front of his apartment at 341 Post Street (900 West) approximately
7:30 p.m. on the evening of September 28, 1975 and he did not see
it again until the following morning when he found it damaged beyond
repair.

(R. 31-34)
Police officer Tim Phelan testified that at about 3:00 a.m.

on the morning of September 29, he observed Mr. Poland's vehicle in
the middle lane of 4th South between 2nd and 3rd West.

He identified

the appellant . as having been slumped behind the wheel of the vehicle
unconscious.

(R. 37, 38)

The officer testified that the appellant's

lips were blue, but there was no evidence of injuries.

He also stated

that the paramedics on the scene diagnosed the appellant's condition
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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as an overdose of narcotics

(R. 41).

Susan Williams, the appellant's ex-wife,testified that he had
been at her apartment at 415 Post Street until about 2:00 - 2:30 a.m.
(R. 58)

She further stated he called her from a hospital about

5:00 a.m. and told her he had "OD'd" on some heroin

(R. 60). When

he had been placed in the ambulance at the scene, a hypodermic needle
he had had in his possession fell out onto the ground

(R. 47).

Counsel for both the State and appellant entered into a stipulation that if a Dr. Richard L. Jackson were called to testify, he
would testify that he treated the appellant in the emergency room of
Holy Cross Hospital in the early morning hours of September 29, 1975 and
diagnosed his condition as an overdose of the drug heroin.

Further,

the Dr. would have testified that appellant lapsed in and out of
consciousness and that one who is overdosed on heroin could commit acts
which he does not consciously remember

(R. 86-87).

Appellant testified in his own defense that after leaving his
ex-wife's apartment, he went to Sherwood Park and "shot up" a large
quantity of heroin

(R. 82-83) . He further testified that he had no

recollection as to what happened after that and had no memory of
getting into a car

(R. 83-84).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CRIME OF UNLAWFUL TAKING OF A VEHICLE PURSUANT
TO UTAH CODE ANN. §41-1-109 (1953) IS NOT A LE~SSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT OF AN OPERABLE MOTOR VEHICLE
PURSUANT~TO UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-404 (AS AMENDED 1973).
The defendant was charged with the crime of Theft pursuant to
Utah Code Ann.

§76-6-404 (1973 as amended) which provides:

"a person commits theft if he obtains or exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another
with a purpose to deprive him thereof.11
Further, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 (1973 as amended) provides:
"Theft of property. . .shall be punishable as follows:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if:
. . .(ii) The property stolen is a firearm or an
operable motor vehicle;"
Two other crimes involving unauthorized use or possession of a
motor vehicle appear in the Utah Code, however, these crimes are
included as part of Utah's Motor Vehicle Act and not as part of the
Criminal Code.

Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 (1953) is uniformly interpreted

as punishing the knowing possession of a stolen motor vehicle as a
felony, while Utah Code Ann. §41-1-109 (1953) punishes the unlawful
taking of a motor vehicle with intent to only temporarily deprive
the owner of his possession as a misdemeanor.

That statute provides:

"Unlawful taking of vehicles a misdemeanor.--Any person who
drives a vehicle, not his own, without the consent of the
owner thereof and with intent temporarily to deprive said
owner of his possession of such vehicle, without intent
to steal the same is guilty of a misdemeanor. The consent
of the owner of a vehicle to its taking or driving shall
not in any case be presumed or implied because of such
owner's consent on a previous occasion to the taking or
driving of such vehicle by the same or a different person.
Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to^
or an accomplice in any such unauthorized taking or driving
Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
is guiltyDigitized
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-.enough ;,'tah s iew ^rin:^ .a. Code,

provides for three different types of misdemeanor offenses , *'

i t i s clear that: the legi slati * e intent in enacting -. .. * . . j w a s to
provide the same punishment for a misdemeanor as was -rovided for I i:i
LI l.ali." "

def i: i i t I 'enal Code
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'

(as amended 1973) provides •
"An offense designated a misdemeanor. either ~: ~: :::,ode or in another law, without specification at :c ounisrment or category, is a class E misdemeanor
A class B misdemeanor is punishable by impxi isonment for a term n o t
e x c e e d i n g s i x months

ox: a f:i ne n ot exceedi iig $299 4'

Since 41-1 -112 is n o t involved in this appeal, attention wil 1
"be focused on, the relati onshi p between 41 • 1-109 and 76-6-412 , supra.
It is established law t'a* .- . f i ^ C c n t can ^e .onvicred oniy
of the offense charged in the information
I] ecessaril y incl i ided ::i n tl I 2 cl: ..
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Ann. §77-33-6 (1953) provides:
1

" 'The jury m a y find the defendant guilty of any
offense the commission of which is necessarily included
in that with which h e is charged in the indictment or
information, or o f an attempt to commit the offense,"
Just exactly what constitutes an offense which is "necessari ly
included 11 is a subject which this Court has chosen to deal with on

1

Utah Code A n n . §76-3-104

2

See Utah Code .Ann, §76-1-16 (Repealed 1 973)

3

I It ah Code An • c :i § 76 3 204 ( is amende* I 1 9 73)

•

Utah Code Ann, §76-3-301 (as .amended 1973)

5.

utah Code

AnUm
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§77.33-4 (1953)

-)

a case by case basis.

See e.g. State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d

640 (1934); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936); State v.
Close, 28 Utah 2d 144, 499 P.2d 287 (1972).
This Court dealt directly with the question of the relationship
of 41-1-109 with Utah's grand larceny statute in effect in 1969 in the
case of State v. Ash, 23 Utah 2d 14, 456 P.2d 154 (1969).

In that

case, the defendant was charged with grand larceny pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §76-38-3 (Repealed 1973).

One of the defendant's assignments

of error was that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on what
he construed to be the lesser and included offense of Unlawful Taking
of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-1-109 (1953), supra.
Writing for the majority, Justice Ellet said:
ff

In the instant case the jury found the defendant guilty
of intending to deprive the owner permanently of the use
of his car, and we cannot see why they should also have been
required to decide if he only intended to deprive the owner
temporarily. The two crimes are based upon contrary intentions
in the mind of the defendant. However, this does not mean
that one offense is necessarily included within the charge
made of the other. An acquittal of one is not a bar to a
prosecution for the other offense. The law is stated in
7 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §343, to be
as follows:
* * * Furthermore, since the offense of taking and using a
motor vehicle without the consent of its owner is distinct
in its elements from the offense of larceny, an acquittal
of one of these offenses is not a bar to a prosecution for
the other. * * *"
456 P.2d 155.
There can be little doubt from this language that this Court has
clearly held that 41-1-109 is not a lesser and included offense of
felony auto theft.

Although decided prior to the adoption of 76-6-404

and 412, supra, this case is clear authority for appellant's argument.
The Supreme Court of Colorado has also ruled that the crime of
joyriding is not a lesser included offense of the crime of auto theft
in Sandoval v. Digitized
People,
176
Col,Law414,490
P.2d
1298
(1971).
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The elements

of Colorado's joyriding statute0 are virtually identical to Utah
Code Ann. §41-1-109 (1953), and Colorado's theft statute is also
identical to Utah's.7

Although lengthy, the following segment of

Justice Hodge's opinion is quoted by appellant as presenting in a
nutshell the legal issue presented by this point on appeal:
"From the foregoing discussion, it appears clear that
an essential element of the crime of theft is the
formation of an intent to permanently deprive the owner
of his property. On the other hand, the crime of joyriding requires as an element of proof an intent to
just temporarily deprive the owner of his property. The
intent to permanently deprive is not a progression of an
intent to temporarily deprive. To state it another way,
the joyriding intent does not mature into the theft
intent. A culprit who takes the automobile of another
has either the intent to permanently deprive or the
intent to temporarily deprive. He cannot have both
intents because the one is exclusive of the other.
Therefore, it follows that the greater offense of
theft of an automobile does not include the element of
intent to temporarily deprive. Under the rule of
Futamata, supra, before an offense can be classified
as a lesser included offense of a greater crime, the
establishment of the greater must also necessarily
establish all the elements required to prove the lesser.
As a consequence, it must be concluded that joyriding
is not a lesser included offense of theft, nor is an
attempt to commit joyriding a lesser included offense
of attempted theft."
490 P.2d at 1300.
In reviewing the procedure involved in the instant case, it will
be noted that the trial judge ruled that 41-1-109 was a lesser and included offense of the information which charged appellant with felony
auto theft pursuant to 76-6-404 and 412 (R. 95, 96). Because this
ruling is in direct conflict with the Court's holding in State v. Ash,
supra, appellant urges this Court to reverse the judgment of guilt and
discharge him from the custody of the Third District Court.

6.

C.R.S. 1963, 13-13-2

7.

1967 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-5-2
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POINT II
THE COURT'S PRONOUNCEMENT OF ACQUITTAL ON THE THEFT CHARGE
PRECLUDED" A LATER FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF A
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE.
"
~~
Even if this Court does not accept appellant's argument as outlined
in Point I of this brief, it is his position that the trial court
acquitted him of the charge contained in the information; and it was
only after discussions among counsel and the court that the Honorable
Gordon R. Hall changed his mind and the verdict, and found the defendant
guilty of a lesser included offense of unlawful taking of a motor
vehicle.

Appellant contends that when Judge Hall pronounced the appel-

lant not guilty of the charge of theft, the trial ended and he could
not later return to the subject and find him guilty of a lesser included offense.
The sequence of events in the trial of this matter is very important
After both sides had rested, counsel for appellant made his closing
argument and cited the precedent of State v. Ash for the proposition
that Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle under 41-1-109 was not a
lesser included offense of theft as charged in the information (R. 90-91)
The trial court then indicated there was reasonable doubt as to the
theft charge and indicated he agreed with counsel that 41-1-109 was
not lesser included and would require a separate prosecution.

The

following exchange occurred:
THE COURT:

The Court in this case does have a reasonable doubt of

the intent of the defendant in this matter and is prepared to so rule.
However, it is very obvious to the Court that in light of Ash that any
further proceeding probably would require an action to be filed.

How-

ever, I hesitate to have the State go to that extent and also to have
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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you defend such an action.

And my suggestion to you now would be

that if we cannot necessarily show that as an included offense, that
of depriving an owner, that you consider at this time the possibility
of a new complaint in this court being filed and have the Court dispose
of that now rather than starting afresh all over again.

No question

in my mind but whether he's guilty of the misdemeanor.
MR. HAYCOCK:

We have alleged that Ash doesn't preclude that

finding and the Court has had all kinds of experience wherein this
very counsel stipulated under this section it's an included -THE COURT:
issue of it.

My only concern is that Mr. Keller has made such an

I have on other cases permitted it to become a lesser

and included offense and have found guilt on that rather than on the
felony.
MR. KELLER:

I feel it is my duty on behalf of my client it's

not a lesser included offense and I believe the language -THE COURT:

I understand that and that's the reason I don't want

to have any difficulty over it and what I am suggesting is I am not
prepared, if I acquit the defendant on the felony charge I'm going
to require the prosecution to proceed on the misdemeanor offense; and
I do not intend to release the defendant today.
(R. 90-91)
It will be noted that appellant maintained the position that the
misdemeanor charge was not lesser included and that the Court seemingly
agreed, stating that he would require the State to proceed on the misdemeanor charge in a seperate action.

The exchange was culminated by

the court's pronouncement of acquittal:
MR. KELLER:

Your Honor, it would be defendant's position to remain

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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firm that it is not a lesser included offense at this point and ask
the Court to consider the case on that basis.
THE COURT:

Knowing the position of the Court, Mr. Keller, re-

garding the misdemeanor I'm going to require a prosecution on that.
Do you have any suggestion on that?
MR. KELLER:

Yes.

May we assume at this point the Court has

acquitted the defendant of the greater offense?
THE COURT:

The record may show that the Court does now acquit

the defendant of the offense as charged, that of theft, a felony
of the second degree.
After this pronouncement of acquittal by the court, arguments
were heard as to whether the State could refile a new complaint.

The

appellant took the position that since he had now been tried once
for this criminal episode and acquitted, that a separate trial would
be subject to a plea of former jeopardy.

This issue was argued by

both counsel for some period of time (R. 90-95).

The Court then

interjected the following statement:
THE COURT:

The Court has again reviewed the content of the

Ash case during the argument of counsel and head note number 2 therein would indicate that a subsequent prosecution is not barred by a
finding of not guilty on the felony.

And as I indicated to you

previously, this Court has on other occasions -- more than one, found
the defendant guilty of a lesser and included offense and rather than
put

the State to any further efforts by way of filing an additional

complaint in this matter, the Court now further finds that the defendant
in this case is guilty of a lesser and included offense, that of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle under the provisions of Title 41,
Digitized by109.
the Howard W.
Hunter Law
J. Reuben
Clark Law School,
BYU. time for sentencing,
Chapter 1, Section
What
isLibrary,
your
desire
as to
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Mr. Keller?
MR. KELLER:

Your Honor, this Court then reverses its judgment of

acquittal?
THE COURT:

No.

I acquitted him on the charge of the felony,

find that he's not guilty of that, but guilty of a lesser and included
offense, that of unlawful taking of a vehicle. No reversal that I
intended in my mind, or intended to convey to you; I am not able to
find him quilty of a felony.
(R. 95-96)
With all due respect for Judge Hall, despite his statement that
he was not reversing his judgment, he clearly adopted a different
position than he maintained at the time he pronounced his verdict of
acquittal (R.62).

He overruled his former judgment that the misdemeanor

of Unlawful Taking of a Vehicle was not lesser included in auto theft
pursuant to State v. Ash, supra, and ruled that it was lesser
included.

He then convicted the appellant of that misdemeanor offense

(R. 66-67).
Even assuming this Court overrules its previous position in Ash,
appellant maintains that once Judge Hall pronounced his acquittal of
the charge as contained in the information, the trial ended and he
should have been discharged.

As a matter of fact, Utah Code Ann.

§77-33-12 (1953) clearly requires such a procedure:
"If judgment of acquittal is given on a verdict, and
the defendant is not detained for any other legal cause,
he must be discharged as soon as the judgment is given."
The arguments of counsel after the verdict was pronounced were
immaterial to the trial that had just ended.

Whether or not the mis-

demeanor charge could have been refiled in a separate action should have
had no effect onDigitized
appellant's
trial for auto theft which had just ended.
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It would be helpful to compare this situation to that of a
jury trial.

Appellant had waived a jury in this case which he had a

right to do pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. §77-27-2 (1953).

Utah's Code

does not spell out procedures in a non-jury trial which are different
than procedures in a jury trial and so it must be presumed that, except
where obviously unnecessary (as in jury instructions), the legislature
intended that a Judge sitting as trier of fact should conduct a trial
as though a jury were present.
Mode of Trial)

(See Utah Code Ann. Chapter 27,

Assuming this to be the case, Judge Hall's procedure

would have been tantamount to the jury having returned from its
deliberation with a verdict of acquittal, then after argument of
counsel as to whether or not the defendant could be tried on another
charge, reversing its verdict and finding him guilty of that other
charge.

In a jury trial, Judge Hall would have had to decide whether

or not the misdemeanor was lesser included in the felony before the
jury retired to deliberate.

Certainly, the judge would

not have been

able to reverse his decision as to the lesser offense after the jury
came back with a verdict of acquittal.

Surely he could not have sent

them back in to deliberate on the appellant's guilt as to another
offense.
This Court considered an issue similar to the one raised in this
appeal in the case of State v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001 (1975).

In that

case the defendant was charged with first degree murder, and waived a
jury in the case.

One of his grounds for appeal was that the judge who

heard the evidence retired from the bench and another judge signed
findings of fact and conclusions of law, even though these were consistent with the verdict of the trial judge.

This Court found no error

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in the procedure.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Crockett

stated:
"The statement by the judge quoted above clearly placed
in the record his verdict and judgment."
532 P.2d at 1005.
It is important at this point to quote that statement of the judge
Justice Crockett referred to:
"The parties having rested and submitted final
argument, this is my ruling: I find that the defendant,
Stewart Michael Kelsey, is guilty of the crime of murder
in the second degree. The testimony of two of Utahfs
most distinguished medical doctors, one a psychiatrist,
and one a forensic pathologist, coupled with other
corroborating testimony, demonstrated that the defendant
had a diminished ability to control himself in the
commission of this crime, and therefore, the elemnts of
murder in the first degree beyond those requisite for
murder in the second degree were not proved by the state
beyond a reasonable doubt. I do find, however, that the
state has proved each and every element of the crime of
murder in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt."
532 P.2d at 1005.
It will be noted that instead of merely announcing an acquittal
of first degree murder, the judge announced there was insufficient
evidence for first degree murder but at the same instant pronounced
the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of second degree
murder.

The language of the Supreme Court decision indicates that it

was at the instant the verdict was pronounced that judgment was entered.
That case is powerful precedent for the instant case, and appellant
asks this court to reaffirm its holding that once a verdict is
announced, judgment occurs and the trial is ended where there is no
jury.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons previously stated, appellant urges this Court to
reverse his conviction and order him discharged from the custody of
of the Court on this matter.
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Respectfully submitted,
O l ^

LARKY R^JCELLER
Attorney jfor Appellant
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